Magnet-Goblin Hackers Targeted Public Services Using One-Day Exploits

Magnet Goblin, a new hacking group, has surfaced by taking advantage of vulnerabilities in Ivanti Connect Secure VPN that was just made public (CVE-2023-46805 & CVE-2023-21887). It allowed the group to install unique Linux backdoors on susceptible devices. Magnet Goblin is known for employing similar strategies to target & profit from platforms such as Magento, Qlik Sense, etc.

Magnet Goblin’s tactic requires quick utilization of recently identified weaknesses to install backdoors on infected devices. Using these backdoors, the group can financially profit by stealing data or illegally accessing with the one-day vulnerabilities. It’s a financially motivated group of cybercriminals who exploit vulnerabilities in public servers & edge devices.

  1. CVE-2022-24086 – Magento.
  2. CVE-2023-41265, CVE-2023-41266, and CVE-2023-48365 in Qlik Sense.
  3. CVE-2023-46805, CVE-2024-21887, CVE-2024-21888, and CVE-2024-21893 are the Ivanti Connect Secure codes.

Moreover, Magnet uses tools like NerbianRAT (cross-platform) for total remote control and MiniNerbian (Linux-specific) for backdoor access, which is part of their proprietary Nerbian malware family.

Past Magnet Goblin Campaign.

Public Servers’ Rapid Exploitation with Custom Malware

After looking into previous Ivanti exploits, researchers discovered downloads connected to the NerbianRAT malware Linux version. This malware could retrieve several malicious attack components from an attacker’s server. Also, the attackers’ malicious servers allowed them to obtain the malware’s new version once they discovered weaknesses.

  1. http://94.156.71[.]115/lxrt
  2. http://91.92.240[.]113/aparche2
  3. http://45.9.149[.]215/aparche2

It employs NerbianRAT with a customized WARPWIRE variant to get VPN details and commute them to the compromised Magento server. This stresses the utilization of several tools that Magnet Goblin uses.

WARPWIRE Variant which Magnet Goblin Uses.

Infrastructure Analysis:

Magnet Goblin's toolkit is not just limited to Linux; it also includes Windows versions. They use reputable programs like AnyDesk & ScreenConnect, which they download from their official website, to gain remote access. It's interesting to know that the IP addresses used to obtain ScreenConnect content match the ones found on hacked Qlik Sense servers. As a result, it points out a potentially larger exploitation effort.

Based on observed techniques and downloaded files, evidence points to potential connections to both the Cactus ransomware and Apache ActiveMQ vulnerabilities. BAT scripts that downloaded and ran AnyDesk were deployed via compromised Magento servers, demonstrating the wide range of techniques this Magnet Goblin employs.

Batch Script Deploying AnyDesk, Using a Hacked Magento Server.

The Linux backdoor known as “NerbianRAT” was first discovered in May 2022. It is not a counter-analysis technique and is not well disguised. When running, it creates a unique bot ID and gathers basic data about the compromised system. After decrypting the system’s working directory, NerbianRAT looks for a configuration file containing several settings, such as the address of the C2 server and the public key used for encryption.

NerbianRAT uses a unique protocol and raw TCP connections to communicate with its C2 server. Depending on the type of data being transferred, AES or RSA is used for encryption. The backdoor functions in 2 main modes: it transmits information to the C2 server and waits for instructions during business hours, and it may still send "ping" messages to the server after hours.

MiniNerbian makes NerbianRAT easier to use for executing commands. It updates configuration, modifies its internal time flag, and executes system commands by sending HTTP POST requests to its C2 server.

Code similarity between NerbianRAT and MiniNerbian.

The difficulty in identifying particular actions in between opportunistic pervasive exploitation attacks comes from the attributional & technical intricacies involved in cybersecurity. Cybersecurity experts sometimes miss out on the actions of hackers who take advantage of certain circumstances in favor of mitigation & reaction.

A recent example of this is the way that several hacking groups exploited the vulnerability in Ivanti Secure Connect VPN before the appliances were fixed. Driven by greed, Magnet Goblin quickly took advantage of 1-day vulnerabilities to spread specialized Linux malware to mostly targeted vulnerable edge devices.

IOCs:

IOC Type

IOC Value

IOC Description

IP

91.92.240[.]113

Magnet Goblin Infra

IP

45.9.149[.]215

Magnet Goblin Infra

IP

94.156.71[.]115

Magnet Goblin Infra

URL

http://91.92.240[.]113/auth.js

Magnet Goblin Infra

URL

http://91.92.240[.]113/login.CGI

Magnet Goblin Infra

URL

http://91.92.240[.]113/aparche2

Magnet Goblin Infra

URL

http://91.92.240[.]113/agent

Magnet Goblin Infra

URL

http://45.9.149[.]215/aparche2

Magnet Goblin Infra

URL

http://45.9.149[.]215/agent

Magnet Goblin Infra

URL

http://94.156.71[.]115/lxrt

Magnet Goblin Infra

URL

http://94.156.71[.]115/agent

Magnet Goblin Infra

URL

http://94.156.71[.]115/instali.ps1

Magnet Goblin Infra

URL

http://94.156.71[.]115/ligocert.dat

Magnet Goblin Infra

URL

http://94.156.71[.]115/angel.dat

Magnet Goblin Infra

URL

http://94.156.71[.]115/windows.xml

Magnet Goblin Infra

URL

http://94.156.71[.]115/instal1.ps1

Magnet Goblin Infra

URL

http://94.156.71[.]115/Maintenance.ps1

Magnet Goblin Infra

URL

http://94.156.71[.]115/baba.dat

Magnet Goblin Infra

URL

**http://**oncloud-analytics[.]com/files/mg/elf/RT1.50.png

Magnet Goblin Infra

URL

http://cloudflareaddons[.]com/assets/img/Image_Slider15.1.png

Magnet Goblin Infra

Domain

mailchimp-addons[.]com

MiniNerbian C2

Domain

allsecurehosting[.]com

MiniNerbian C2

Domain

dev-clientservice[.]com

MiniNerbian C2

Domain

oncloud-analytics[.]com

MiniNerbian C2

Domain

cloudflareaddons[.]com

MiniNerbian C2

Domain

textsmsonline[.]com

MiniNerbian C2

Domain

proreceive[.]com

MiniNerbian C2

IP

172.86.66[.]165

NerbianRAT C2

IP

45.153.240[.]73

NerbianRAT C2

SHA256

027d03679f7279a2c505f0677568972d30bc27daf43033a463fafeee0d7234f6

NerbianRAT

SHA256

9cb6dc863e56316364c7c1e51f74ca991d734dacef9029337ddec5ca684c1106

NerbianRAT

SHA256

9d11c3cf10b20ff5b3e541147f9a965a4e66ed863803c54d93ba8a07c4aa7e50

NerbianRAT

SHA256

d3fbae7eb3d38159913c7e9f4c627149df1882b57998c8acaac5904710be2236

MiniNerbian

SHA256

df91410df516e2bddfd3f6815b3b4039bf67a76f20aecabccffb152e5d6975ef

MiniNerbian

SHA256

99fd61ba93497214ac56d8a0e65203647a2bc383a2ca2716015b3014a7e0f84d

MiniNerbian

SHA256

9ff0dcce930bb690c897260a0c5aaa928955f4ffba080c580c13a32a48037cf7

MiniNerbian

SHA256

3367a4c8bd2bcd0973f3cb22aa2cb3f90ce2125107f9df2935831419444d5276

MiniNerbian

SHA256

f23307f1c286143b974843da20c257901cf4be372ea21d1bb5dea523a7e2785d

MiniNerbian

SHA256

f1e7c1fc06bf0ea40986aa20e774d6b85c526c59046c452d98e48fe1e331ee4c

MiniNerbian

SHA256

926aeb3fda8142a6de8bc6c26bc00e32abc603c21acd0f9b572ec0484115bb89

MiniNerbian

SHA256

894ab5d563172787b052f3fea17bf7d51ca8e015b0f873a893af17f47b358efe

MiniNerbian

SHA256

1079e1b6e016b070ebf3e1357fa23313dcb805d3a6805088dbc3ab6d39330548

WARPWIRE

SHA256

e134e053a80303d1fde769e50c2557ade0852fa827bed9199e52f67bac0d9efc

WARPWIRE

URL

www.fernandestechnical[.]com/pub/health_check.php

Compromised Server

URL

biondocenere[.]com/pub/health_check.php

Compromised Server

URL

****www.miltonhouse[.]nl/pub/opt/processor.php

Compromised Server

URL

https://theroots[.]in/pub/media/avatar/223sam.jpg

Compromised Server

SHA256

7967def86776f36ab6a663850120c5c70f397dd3834f11ba7a077205d37b117f

Tools & Scripts

SHA256

9895286973617a79e2b19f2919190a6ec9afc07a9e87af3557f3d76b252292df

Tools & Scripts

SHA256

bd9edc3bf3d45e3cdf5236e8f8cd57a95ca3b41f61e4cd5c6c0404a83519058e

Tools & Scripts

SHA256

b35f11d4f54b8941d4f1c5b49101b67b563511a55351e10ad4ede17403529c16

Tools & Scripts

SHA256

7b1d1e639d1994c6235d16a7ac583e583687660d7054a2a245dd18f24d10b675

Tools & Scripts

SHA256

8fe1ed1e34e8758a92c8d024d73c434665a03e94e5eb972c68dd661c5e252469

Tools & Scripts

SHA256

fa317b071da64e3ee18d82d3a6a216596f2b4bca5f4d3277a091a137d6a21c45

Tools & Scripts

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